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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992), and the Order of the
Supreme Court of Utah, dated July 26, 1993, pouring-over this
case.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, West One submits the following Statement of Issues as
more properly framing the issues that are before the Court:
1.

May a creditor rely on § 70A-9-318(3), Utah Code

Ann. to subordinate the rights of another creditor with a prior
perfected security interest?
2.

Did West One's Notice of Assignment to Life of

Virginia contractually obligate West One to notify Life of
Virginia of United Underwriters, Inc.'s default in order to
establish West One's priority as a secured creditor?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Section 70A-9-201, Utah Code Ann.;

Except as otherwise provided by this act
a security agreement is effective according
to its terms between the parties, against
purchasers of the collateral and against
creditors. Nothing in this chapter validates
any charge or practice illegal under any
statute or regulation thereunder governing
usury, small loans, retail installment sales,
or the like, or extends the application of
any such statute or regulation to any
transaction not otherwise subject thereto.
2.

Section 70A-9-318(3), Utah Code Ann.:

The account debtor is authorized to pay
the assignor until the account debtor
receives notification that the amount due or
to become due has been assigned and that
payment is to be made to the assignee. A
notification which does not reasonably
identify the rights assigned is ineffective.
If requested by the account debtor, the
assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable

proof that the assignment has been made and
unless he does so the account debtor may pay
the assignor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
West One is a secured creditor of United Underwriters,
Inc. ("UUI"), with a valid, perfected first lien on all of UUI's
accounts receivable, insurance commissions and bonuses that are
due and payable to UUI from a number of insurance companies,
including appellant Life of Virginia.

West One's security

interest was perfected in 1988 to secure the repayment of a $1.5
million loan.

Life of Virginia is both an account debtor and a

creditor of UUI, owing UUI commissions under a brokerage
agreement and having loaned UUI $100,000 in 1989. When UUI
defaulted on its obligations to Life of Virginia, Life of
Virginia set off UUI's obligation to it with approximately
$123,000 in funds that it owed UUI. The funds retained by Life
of Virginia constituted an account receivable that was subject to
West One's perfected security interest.
This matter was submitted to the trial court on cross
motions for summary judgment.

Judge Iwasaki entered an order

granting summary judgment in favor of West One on May 28, 1993.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Appellant unlawfully interfered with West One's

prior, perfected security interest in UUI's accounts receivable.
The law in Utah is clear: An Article Nine secured creditor with
a prior perfected security interest has priority over "anyone,

anywhere, anyhow."

Insley Manufacturing Corp, v. Draper Bank &

Trust, 717 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986).

When Life of Virginia set off

UUI's obligation with funds it owed UUI, it was acting as a
creditor of UUI in derogation of West One's rights.

The fact

that appellant was also an account debtor of UUI does not alter
the rules of priority as between two creditors. As an account
debtor, Life of Virginia was authorized to pay UUI until it was
instructed to pay West One directly.

Life of Virginia was not

authorized to apply West One's collateral to satisfy a debt owed
by UUI to itself.
2.

Appellant's Statement of Issues is misleading and

incorrect, and the matters being raised by appellant for the
first time should not be considered on appeal.
a.

Appellant's right of set off did not accrue before

it received the notice of assignment from West One.
Appellant's statement that "[appellant's] right ... to
retain commissions ... accrued before [it] received
notice of assignment" is wholly incorrect and
unsupported by the record.

The undisputed evidence is

directly contrary to this assertion:

Appellant

received West One's Notice of Assignment in December
1987.

Brief of Appellant, p. 3. Appellant loaned

funds to UUI in March 1989 and later that year set off
UUI's obligation by retaining commissions it owed UUI.
Id. at p. 4.

West One's rights as a secured creditor

were perfected in 1988, prior to the time appellant
became a creditor of UUI and therefor prior to the time
appellant's right of set off accrued.
b.

West One will not receive a "double payment."

There is simply no evidence to support appellant's
assertion that West One will reap a double benefit if
appellant is required to turn over to West One the
funds it set off.

Appellant "presumes" that UUI used

the funds it borrowed from appellant to make payments
to West One.

There is absolutely no evidence regarding

UUI's use of the borrowed funds and appellant's "double
payment" theory is meritless and irrelevant.
c.

West One's rights as a secured creditor were

perfected upon filing; they were not "exercisable only
on default of UUI," and the "failure to establish the
date of default by UUI" is irrelevant.

Appellant is

attempting to inject immaterial issues of fact into
this appeal.

It has never been disputed that West One

perfected its security interest in UUI's receivables
long before appellant used the funds it owed UUI to set
off UUI's obligations.
d.

Appellant's argument should be limited to the

matters presented to the trial court.

Appellant's

argument to the trial court was that § 70A-9-318(3),
Utah Code Ann. allows an account debtor to subordinate

an assignee's prior perfected security interest unless
the account debtor is specifically instructed to pay
the assignee. Alternatively, appellant argued, because
West One gave appellant notice of its assignment, West
One became "contractually obligated" to notify
appellant of UUI's default.

See generally Memorandum

in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed January 8, 1993. These are the only questions of
law that are properly before the Court.
ARGUMENT
1.

LIFE OF VIRGINIA UNLAWFULLY INTERFERED
WITH WEST ONE'S SECURITY INTEREST IN
UUI's ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE

Life of Virginia has apparently confused its rights as
an account debtor with its rights as a creditor.

As an account

debtor, Life of Virginia had the right, indeed the obligation, to
pay UUI the commissions and bonuses that it owed UUI unless and
until it received notice from West One to pay West One directly.
As a creditor, however, Life of Virginia's right to set off UUI's
debt with amounts that it owed UUI was subordinate to West One's
prior, perfected security interest.
The law in Utah, as well as the overwhelming majority
of other jurisdictions, is that a creditor's perfected security
interest in collateral has priority over any subsequent right of
setoff.

See, e.g., Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank &

Trust, 717 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986).

See also Pioneer Commercial

Funding Corp. v. United Airlines, Inc., 122 Bankr. 871 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991), In re Apex Oil Company, 975 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.
1992), First National Bank and Trust Co. of Oklahoma v. Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc., 626 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1980), Griffin v.
Continental American Life Insurance Co., 722 F.2d 671 (11th Cir.
1984).

See also Annotation, Effect of UCC Article 9 Upon

Conflict as to Funds in Debtor's Bank Account Between Secured
Creditor and Bank Claiming Right of Setoff, 3 A.L.R. 4th 998
(1978).

This position reflects the general rule that the rights

of a secured creditor in collateral are greater than those of any
other creditor, except as otherwise set forth in Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.

White & Summers, Uniform Commercial

Code § 25-2 (1980).
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Inslev
Manufacturing is controlling in this case.

There, Insley sold a

backhoe to Schneider Machinery Sales, receiving a security
interest in the backhoe and its proceeds, which it properly
perfected.

Schneider sold the backhoe to a third party and

deposited the proceeds in its account at Draper Bank & Trust
("Draper").

Because Schneider was in default on an obligation to

Draper, Draper used the proceeds to set off the unsecured
obligation of Schneider to the bank, rendering Schneider unable
to pay Insley for the backhoe.

Insley sued Draper, asserting that its security
interest in the proceeds of the backhoe was superior to Draper's
right of setoff, and that Draper's setoff constituted an improper
conversion of funds. The Utah Supreme Court agreed.

After a

detailed discussion of the applicability of the Uniform
Commercial Code to a right of setoff, the Court concluded that
"the Code's priority rules require that Insley's interest must
prevail over Draper's right of setoff.... The effect of TUCC
Section 9-2011 is to give the Article Nine secured party, upon a
debtor's default, priority over 'anyone, anywhere, anyhow,'
except as otherwise provided by the remaining Code priority
rules."

Insley Manufacturing, 717 P.2d at 1347 (emphasis added)

(quoting Continental American Life Insurance Co. v. Griffin, 306
S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ga. 1983)).
West One's perfected security interest in commissions
due from Life of Virginia to UUI is undisputed.

Its UCC-1

financing statement put the world on notice of its claim to these
commissions.

West One took the additional precaution of giving

Life of Virginia specific notice of its assignment from UUI,
which Life of Virginia acknowledged in December 1987, more than a
year before it loaned money to UUI. As a secured party, West
One's prior perfected interest in the commissions is clearly
superior to Life of Virginia's right of setoff.
Life of Virginia has attempted to make an issue of the
fact that West One did not direct Life of Virginia to make

payments directly to West One. Life of Virginia again fails to
recognize the critical distinction between its role as an account
debtor and its role as a creditor. Although West One may have
had the right to request direct payments, it had absolutely no
obligation to due so, and it was fully entitled to rely on the
strength of its prior perfected security interest.

As an account

debtor, Life of Virginia had a continuing obligation to pay UUI
until it received notice from West One to make payments directly
to the bank.

West One's failure to make such a demand only

protects appellant from a claim by West One that appellant should
not have paid UUI. Appellant has mistakenly leapt to the
conclusion that West One's silence somehow conferred rights of
subordination.

There is nothing in the case law to support such

a conclusion.
It is incumbent on a creditor contemplating setoff to
search the records and determine whether the property is subject
to a security interest.

See National Acceptance Company of

America v. Virginia National Bank, 498 Fed. Supp. 1078, 1086
(E.D. Va. 1980) (because bank made no effort to search the
appropriate records to determine whether any security interests
or financing statements had been filed, it was precluded from
exercising any right of setoff and guilty of conversion of
secured party's funds).

Here, appellant was not even required to

search the records to determine if UUI's accounts receivable had
been assigned to a creditor.

Appellant had previously received

notice and acknowledged West One's existing security interest in
UUI's receivables.
On the question of whether an assignee must
specifically request payment from the account debtor or risk
subordination, Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 122 Bankr. 871 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), is
directly on point.

There, Presidential Airways, Inc.

("Presidential") entered a financing contract with Pioneer
Commercial Funding Corporation ("Pioneer").

Presidential secured

its obligation by an assignment of its accounts receivable, which
was duly perfected by Pioneer.

One of Presidential's major

account debtors was United Airlines, Inc. ("United").

Pioneer

Commercial Funding, 122 Bankr. at 875.
Prior to the financing arrangement between Presidential
and Pioneer, Presidential borrowed $3.5 million from United on an
unsecured basis. When Presidential defaulted on its obligation
to United, United set off the amount it owed to Presidential and
applied it to Presidential's outstanding debt.

Pioneer filed an

action against United alleging conversion and tortious
interference with contract, claiming that United knew of the
assignment when it took the setoff.

Id. at 876. United defended

the action under a number of theories, including Pioneer's
failure to specifically demand payment from United.

Id. at 882.

Interpreting § 70A-9-318(3) of New York's Uniform
Commercial Code, which is identical to § 70A-9-318(3), Utah Code

Ann., the Court declared United's position to be erroneous:
"United then takes a drastic, and unsupported, leap to its
contention that since Pioneer does not allege making such a
payment demand, a fortiori, its rights are subordinated to those
of United....

This view is simply erroneous."

Id.

Life of Virginia is attempting to take the same drastic
and unsupported leap in its logic.

There is no dispute that West

One did not deliver a payment demand directly to appellant as an
account debtor.

West One agrees that appellant never had an

obligation to pay West One directly.

Nevertheless, appellant had

an obligation as a creditor to apprise itself of prior perfected
security interests before exercising a setoff.

As the holder of

a valid first priority perfected security interest in commissions
due from Life of Virginia, West One's rights are superior to
"anyone, anywhere, anyhow," including Life of Virginia.

See

Insley Manufacturing, 717 P.2d at 1347.
2.

APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES IS MISLEADING AND
INCORRECT, AND MATTERS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED.

Most of appellant's "issues," and a large part of its
arguments, are wholly unsupported by the record and should not be
considered by the Court.

See Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins.

Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978) (appellate court will not consider
any facts not properly cited to or supported by the record).
Moreover, this matter was submitted to the trial court
on joint motions for summary judgment.

There are no disputed

facts.

Appellant's only arguments to the trial court were that

§ 70A-9-318(3), Utah Code Ann. allows an account debtor to
subordinate an assignee's prior perfected security interest
unless it is specifically instructed to pay the assignee, and
that West One's notice of assignment "contractually obligated"
West One to notify appellant of UUI's default.
Appellant now claims that its right to retain
commissions accrued before it received the notice of UUI's
assignment to West Onef that West One will reap a "double
benefit" if appellant is required to disgorge the commissions,
and that West One's rights were exercisable only on UUI's
default.

These arguments were never raised in the trial court,

and they should not be considered on appeal.1

See Lane v.

Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986) (issue not raised by pleadings
and not addressed by trial court may not be raised for first time
on appeal).
Appellant relies heavily on a case from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Haas v. MetroGoldwvn-Mayer Inc., 617 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1980), for its
argument that West One's notice of assignment was insufficient.
Appellant neglects to mention that the account debtor in Haas

1

Appellant vaguely suggests that its loan to UUI was
"presumably" used by UUI to keep its note to West One current.
It also attempts to equate its setoff with actual payment to UUI.
Both of these arguments ignore the record in this case, statutory
authority, and the governing case law.

actually paid the assignor, not another creditor.
F.2d at 1139.

See Haas, 617

If appellant had paid the assignor (UUI), West One

would not have a claim against appellant.

But appellant paid

itself, an unsecured creditor, by retaining funds subject to West
One's perfected security interest.
Finally, appellant attempts to rely on § 70A-9-311,
Utah Code Ann. for the proposition that West One's perfected
security interest could be "involuntarily transferred" to Life of
Virginia.

Appellant's reliance is misplaced.

Section 70A-9-311

deals with the rights of a debtor, not an assignee.

It provides:

"The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or
involuntarily transferred (by way of sale, creation of a security
interest, attachment, levy, garnishment, or other judicial
process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement
prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a
default."

In March 1989, when appellant took an assignment from

UUI, UUI had nothing left to convey, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, because its rights had already been assigned to
West One.

See Calimari & Perillo, Contracts (West 2d Ed. 1977),

§ 18-16 at p. 650 (Once assignee's rights are vested by proper
notice to account debtor, assignee's rights are vested and can
not be altered by the assignor or the account debtor).
CONCLUSION
Appellant's misplaced reliance on § 70A-9-318(3) does
not affect the relative priorities of creditors.

The fatal

weakness in appellant's case is revealed in paragraph 10 of
appellant's Statement of Facts:

"On or about March 1, 1989 ...

UUI assigned to [appellant] all of its right, title and interest
in and to any and all commissions to which UUI was entitled."

In

March 1989 UUI had no right, title or interest in those
commissions because it had already assigned them to West One.
See 4 Corbin on Contracts (West 1960) § 902 at p. 615-16 ("By the
first assignment, the right became [the first assignee's], so
that at the time of the second assignment, the assignor had no
rights and could therefore transfer none.")

Appellant knew this

because it had actual notice of UUI's prior assignment to West
One.

The holding in Insley Manufacturing should govern the

disposition of this case. Appellant asks the Court to ignore the
Utah Supreme Court's holding in Insley Manufacturing and overturn
the trial court's decision.

The trial court properly considered

applicable statutes and governing case law and concluded that the
rights of a party asserting a right of setoff are subordinate to
those of a secured creditor.

That decision was correct, and West

One respectfully requests the Court to affirm the trial court's
decision.
DATED this Is®

day of October 1993.

CAR0L]O^0l5(SlNffiRY

JAMESUy. WOODALL
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Counsel for West One Bank, Utah
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FINDINGS OF FACT
The case was submitted to the Court largely on
undisputed facts which the Court accepts and adopts as its own
findings, as follows:
1.

Pursuant to a Brokerage Contract dated October 22,

1986 and effectively dated January 1, 1984 ("Brokerage Contract")
between UUI and Life of Virginia, Life of Virginia agreed to pay
UUI certain insurance commissions.
2.
$1,500,000.

On or about December 22, 1987, West One loaned UUI
The obligation was evidenced by a promissory note

("Note") in that amount.
3.

To secure payment of the Note, UUI executed and

delivered to West One a Collateral Pledge Agreement ("Pledge
Agreement") whereby West One obtained a security interest in,
among other things, the right to receive certain commissions
payable to UUI from various insurance companies including the
commissions due from Life of Virginia under the Brokerage
Contract.
4.

As part of the Pledge Agreement, UUI executed and

delivered to West One an Assignment dated December 22, 1987 in
which UUI assigned to West One all sums of money due or to become
due to UUI from Life of Virginia under the Brokerage Contract.
5.

The Assignment is part of an Assignment of

Contracts as Collateral dated December 22, 1987 and executed by
UUI and West One.

51500
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6.

Paragraph 7.a. of the Assignment of Contracts as

Collateral provides in part that "Assignor is further authorized
to direct the companies under any contracts hereafter entered
into by Assignor, on receipt of written notice from Assignee, to
pay to Assignee all rents, income, issue and profits accruing
under the contracts . . . "
7.

In December 1987, West One sent Life of Virginia a

written Notice of Assignment.

The Notice of Assignment provides

that "upon written notice from [West One], all monies due or to
become due under the [Brokerage Contract] are to be paid to [West
One] pursuant to this Assignment."
8.

On December 30, 1987, Life of Virginia

acknowledged receipt of the Notice of Assignment.
9.

On March 2, 1988, West One perfected its security

interest in the Brokerage Contract by filing a UCC-1 Financing
Statement with the Utah Department of Commerce and Commercial
Code.
10.

On or about March 1, 1989, UUI borrowed $100,000

from Life of Virginia and executed a promissory note in favor of
Life of Virginia in that amount.

To secure its obligation to

Life of Virginia, UUI assigned to Life of Virginia all of its
right, title and interest in and to any and all commissions to
which UUI was entitled under the Brokerage Contract.
11.

Life of Virginia subsequently used commissions it

owed to UUI to satisfy UUI's debt on the $100,000 loan.

51500
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12.

UUI defaulted on the Note and Pledge Agreement

with West One, and currently owes West One in excess of $668,000.
13.

Until shortly before the filing of this action by

West One, Life of Virginia was unaware of UUI's default on its
obligations to West One, and West One never directed Life of
Virginia to pay West One the commissions owed under the Brokerage
Contract.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

West One's prior perfected security interest in

commissions due and owing to UUI gave West One priority over
"anyone, anywhere, anyhow," Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper
Bank & Trust. 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986), including Life of
Virginia.

Life of Virginia's argument that Section 70A-9-318(3),

Utah Code Ann. and West One's Notice of Assignment required West
One to give Life of Virginia notice of UUI's default are not
persuasive.

See Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. United

Airlines, Inc.. 122 Bankr. 875, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
JUDGMENT

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, with
prejudice.

And, based upon the representations made to the Court

by counsel for the parties, JUDGMENT is granted against defendant
and in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $123,316.54, with
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